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COMMENT
NOT JUST ANY PRETEXT: THE 2020 CENSUS
AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
INTRODUCTION
It was something out of a Dan Brown novel. Parked outside of a
convenience store, the estranged daughter of Dr. Thomas Hofeller, the
“Michelangelo of gerrymandering,” Googles her father’s name and stumbles
upon his weeks-old obituary.1 She visits her mother’s retirement home
where, on a shelf in her father’s old room, she spots a plastic bag full of
thumb drives that she hopes might have some old photographs on them.2
Happily, they do.3 They also contain something else: work product from her
father’s days as a redistricting consultant, including a 2015 secret plan for
Republicans to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census—and asserting
that to do so would be “advantageous to Republicans and Non-Hispanic
Whites in redistricting.”4
Conspicuously, mere weeks before Hofeller’s archives made headlines,
the Trump administration had appeared in front of the U.S. Supreme Court
defending its decision to do exactly that.5 Its justification, however, was
quite different. It claimed the citizenship question was added in response to
a Department of Justice (DOJ) request to aid its Voting Rights Act of 19656
(VRA) enforcement efforts.7 It had neglected to disclose Hofeller’s
“significant role” both in devising the strategy and crafting the VRA rationale

1. Michael Wines, Deceased G.O.P. Strategist’s Hard Drives Reveal New Details on the
Census
Citizenship
Question,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
30,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/us/census-citizenship-question-hofeller.html
[https://perma.cc/L93W-TA3R].
2. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for the Court to Issue Direction to Legislative Defendants at
Exh. A at 6, Common Cause v. Lewis (N.C. Super. Ct. June 6, 2019) (No. 18-CVS014001).
3. Id. at Exh. A at 8.
4. NYIC Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Order to Show Cause at 1, New York v. Dep’t of
Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded
sub nom. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (No. 18-cv-02921).
5. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct.
2551 (2019) (No. 18-966).
6. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and
52 U.S.C.)
7. Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of Com., U.S. Dep’t of Com. to Karen Dunn
Kelley, Under Sec’y for Econ. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Com. 1 (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2018-03-26_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AYYC6B7].
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in a draft paragraph that DOJ had lifted verbatim into its request letter to
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross.8
Naturally, the Hofeller revelation was news to many—including,
reportedly, the Chief Justice.9 After initially voting to uphold the question,
Chief Justice Roberts subsequently defected to join the Court’s liberal wing
on the narrow (but determinative) question of whether the VRA rationale was
pretextual.10 Thus, while the challengers’ substantive claims failed, they
eked out a procedural victory for one simple reason: the VRA rationale was
a lie.11
For many, this “smoking gun” seemed rather quaint. They had smelled
smoke all along. At the time, the Trump administration had yet to attempt to
enforce the VRA; the suggestion that it “suddenly viewed minority voting
rights as a priority” rang somewhat hollow.12 Further, the claim that adding
the question would aid VRA enforcement was “both dubious as a policy
proposition and indefensible as a practical matter.”13 Each of the civil rights
groups “most fiercely advocating” for VRA enforcement loudly opposed
adding the question.14 Finally, the administrative record revealed that the
request had not originated at DOJ at all. Despite sworn testimony that he had
acted “solely” in response to DOJ’s request, Ross had actually scoured the
executive branch for anyone willing to ask him to ask about citizenship,15
eventually cajoling the DOJ to reflect his own request back to him.16
But this was not just any pretext—it was a truly perverse one. As this
Comment argues, the Trump administration’s meddling in the 2020 Census
is poised to have a dire impact on the very interests the VRA was designed
to protect and the mechanisms by which it protects them. Part I introduces
the points of intersection between the census and the VRA. Part II then
details the Trump administration’s actions and their ongoing corrosive effect
on the VRA’s foundational values. Finally, Part III proposes steps that may
soften the blow.
I. THE CENSUS AND THE VRA
Importantly, it did not have to be a lie. As discussed in this Part, in some
parallel universe, it could have been plausible to suggest that collecting more
8. NYIC Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Order to Show Cause, supra note 4, at 3.
9. See Joan Biskupic, Exclusive: How John Roberts Killed the Census Citizenship
Question, CNN (Sept. 12, 2019, 1:33PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/12/politics/johnroberts-census-citizenship-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/K78V-CH26].
10. See id.
11. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019).
12. See Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux et al., “Contrived”: The Voting Rights Act Pretext for
the Trump Administration’s Failed Attempt to Add a Citizenship Question to the 2020 Census,
38 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 322, 323 (2020).
13. Janai Nelson, Counting Change: Ensuring an Inclusive Census for Communities of
Color, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1403–04 (2019).
14. Justin Levitt, Citizenship and the Census, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1375–76 (2019).
15. New York v. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
16. See Cepeda Derieux et al., supra note 12, at 333.
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granular citizenship data would aid VRA enforcement. First, Part I.A
introduces the census; Part I.B then delves into its relationship with the VRA.
A. The Census
Congress has delegated to the Department of Commerce the responsibility
to conduct an “actual enumeration” every ten years, beginning on April 1,
and to produce a tabulation of the number of persons residing in each state
by the end of the year.17
1. How it Works
The tabulation is used for many things, including the apportionment of
congressional seats;18 redistricting;19 allocation of federal funding;20 and,
yes, VRA enforcement.21 For apportionment, state populations are funneled
through a convoluted formula that calculates states’ representative counts,
which are then delivered to each governor.22 For redistricting, the U.S.
Census Bureau (the “Bureau”) typically publishes block-level population
data a few months into the following year, allowing states to expediently
redraw their districts.23
While the goal of each decennial census is simple—to count everyone
residing in the country “once, only once and in the right place”24—executing
that goal is trickier.25 Typically, gathering data takes about five months,26
including (a) soliciting self-responses27 and (b) “Nonresponse Followup”
(NRFU), which itself is comprised of several steps to correct for a missing

17. 13 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4, 21, 141(a).
18. See id. § 141(b).
19. See Levitt, supra note 14, at 1372.
20. See id. at 1357.
21. See infra Part I.B.2.
22. About
Congressional
Apportionment,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/topics/public-sector/congressional-apportionment/about.html
[https://perma.cc/YN56-4C7X] (last visited Mar. 25, 2021).
23. See Yurij Rudensky et al., How Changes to the 2020 Census Timeline Will Impact
Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 4, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/how-changes-2020-census-timeline-will-impact-redistricting
[https://perma.cc/Y9JE-M9MQ].
24. Ron Jarmin, Counting Everyone Once, Only Once and in the Right Place, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2018/11/
counting_everyoneon.html [https://perma.cc/B99Z-PYDW].
25. See generally Operational Design Integration Models: Supplement to the 2020
Census
Operational
Plan,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(Dec.
18,
2018),
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2020/program-management/planningdocs/2020-oper-design-model.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS2N-C5AR].
26. See generally 2020 Census Operational Timeline, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://2020census.gov/content/dam/2020census/materials/partners/2020-03/2020-censusoperational-timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7EM-CMKA] (last visited Apr. 16, 2021).
27. See
Questions
Asked
on
the
Form,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://2020census.gov/en/about-questions.html [https://perma.cc/A2YL-AAR8] (last visited
Mar. 25, 2021).
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self-response.28 Self-responses are preferable—more accurate, more
complete, and less onerous to obtain than NRFU data.29 After NRFU ends,
the Bureau typically takes several months to process the data.30
The Bureau also separately conducts the American Community Survey
(ACS) on an annual basis, sampling only a small fraction of American
households and covering a more extensive set of topics—including
citizenship.31
2. Where It Fails: Differential Undercount
Given the enormity of these tasks, it is perhaps unsurprising that the
decennial census and the ACS remain chronically imperfect. Their most
significant flaw is the “differential undercount,” or disproportionate erasure,
of racial and ethnic minorities.32 From 1940 to 1990, only one decennial
census missed less than 5 percent of the Black population.33 The 2010
Census (“one of the most accurate Censuses to date”) undercounted 2.1
percent of the Black population, 1.5 percent of the Latinx population, and 4.9
percent of the American Indian and Alaskan Native populations, while
overcounting non-Hispanic whites by 0.8 percent.34
To their credit, Bureau career experts are diligently transparent about
this.35 Undercounts occur even absent “nefarious” interference, due, for
example, to minority groups concentrating in high-density areas and being
more transient, among other reasons.36 “Nefarious” forces matter too, such
as fear of census responses being used against respondents.37 And naturally,
many of the non-“nefarious” realities are themselves products of a broader
28. See New York v. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551
(2019).
29. Id.
30. See Ron Jarmin, Update on 2020 Census Data Processing and Quality, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU
(Nov.
5,
2020),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/randomsamplings/2020/11/update-2020-census-data-processing-and-quality.html
[https://perma.cc/BFK7-4KNQ].
31. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNDERSTANDING AND USING AMERICAN COMMUNITY
SURVEY DATA:
WHAT RESEARCHERS NEED TO KNOW
1–2 (2020),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/acs/acs_researchers_
handbook_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3LW-M2F6].
32. Nelson, supra note 13, at 1409–11.
33. Margo Anderson & Stephen E. Fienberg, The 2000 Census: Litigation, Results, and
Implications, 77 N.D. L. REV. 665, 669 (2001).
34. Nelson, supra note 13, at 1426.
35. See generally Counting the Hard to Count in a Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July
2019), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2019/demo/
Hard-to-Count-Populations-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3RV-V7B8].
36. See Molly Danahy & Danielle Lang, Distortion in the Census: America’s Oldest
Gerrymander?, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 1065, 1072–73 (2019).
37. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2020 CENSUS BARRIERS, ATTITUDES, AND MOTIVATORS
STUDY
(CBAMS)
SURVEY
AND
FOCUS
GROUPS,
96–98
(2018),
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2020/program-management/pmrmaterials/2019-02-01/5-cbams-survey-report-findings.pdf? [https://perma.cc/6XT4-AX23];
Levitt, supra note 14, at 1363; Counting the Hard to Count in a Census, supra note 35, at 4.
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history of racism simultaneously outside the Bureau’s control while also
inside its data.38
B. The VRA
While the census remains inextricably mired in symptoms of
discrimination, the VRA represents one of the most “successful pieces of
civil rights legislation” ever taken to combat them.39 Designed to “banish
the blight of racial discrimination in voting,”40 the VRA proscribes both overt
electoral discrimination—e.g., literacy tests—as well as some of the “less
blatant” tactics that “innovat[ive]” jurisdictions have honed in response to
being robbed of their blunter instruments.41
1. Section 2 Vote Dilution Claims
Among the more complex methods used by post-VRA redistricting
authorities is to dilute the voting power of minority groups.42 Generally, this
can be accomplished either by “cracking” the group among many districts in
order to render it powerless within any one district, or “packing” it into as
few districts as possible in order to cabin its influence.43
Importantly, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v.
Holder44 to neuter Section 5 of the VRA’s effective45 prophylactic
protections, which required problematic jurisdictions to preclear potentially
discriminatory electoral actions, retroactive claims under Section 2 are now
“almost all that is left of the” VRA.46 Thus, because, as Part I.B.2 explains,
these claims live and die on census data, the only operative check on
discriminatory redistricting is susceptible to the precise kinds of census
meddling discussed in Part II.
2. The Census and Section 2
Section 2 claimants must prove, under “the totality of circumstances,” that
a protected class has “less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to . . . elect representatives of their choice.”47 The Supreme Court has read

38. See Danahy & Lang, supra note 36, at 1072–73.
39. See AM. C.L. UNION, THE CASE FOR RESTORING AND UPDATING THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT
11
(2019),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/
aclu_2019_report_to_congress_on_the_voting_rights_act_final_for_submission.pdf
[https://perma.cc/77QP-PKP4].
40. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
41. See AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 39, at 8.
42. See id. at 4.
43. See Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom
to Count, and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755, 766 (2011).
44. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
45. See AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 39, at 14.
46. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1332
(2016).
47. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).
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three conditions—the Gingles factors—into this language.48 The group must
be (1) “sufficiently large and geographically compact”; (2) “politically
cohesive”; and (3) subject to drowning out by another politically cohesive
voting bloc.49
These inquiries—particularly Gingles 1—hinge on census data. To satisfy
Gingles 1, a group must “show that they could constitute more than half of
the electorate in a district-sized population.”50 Such a claim typically relies51
on block-level “citizen voting-age population” (CVAP) data that the Bureau
calculates by scaling sampled ACS citizenship data across total population
data derived from the decennial census.52 If a claimant cannot establish a
sufficient minority population through this census data, the claim cannot
proceed.53
Because the ACS only surveys a few million Americans at a time, CVAP
data is, at the best of times, imperfect estimates.54 And when the census is
subject to the kind of manipulation chronicled in Part II, the likelihood
increases that Gingles-sufficient minority populations that do, in fact, exist,
are nonetheless absent from the data—thwarting those groups’ only path to
proportional electoral representation.
II. DISENFRANCHISEMENT: 2020
Enter Trump. His administration’s 2020 Census meddling can be neatly
dissected into discrete vignettes, which, as Part II.A illustrates, fit neatly Dr.
Hofeller’s vision of advantaging non-Hispanic, white Republicans.55 And as
Part II.B demonstrates, despite the VRA pretext that accompanied it, the
2020 Census saga has instead undercut the VRA’s foundational values.
A. The 2020 Census
That saga unfolded in three acts: (1) the citizenship question; (2) the order
to erase “illegal aliens” from the apportionment count; and (3) the Trump
administration’s COVID-19 response.
1. Citizenship Question
Secretary Ross’s directive to add the citizenship question circumvented the
Bureau’s “robust” process for vetting prospective questions, disregarded
48. See Ellen Katz et. al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 660
(2006).
49. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986).
50. Levitt, supra note 14, at 1376–77 (cataloguing the ways in which census data informs
all three Gingles steps).
51. See id.
52. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 31, at 17.
53. See Persily, supra note 43, at 778 (noting that Section 2 plaintiffs have occasionally
satisfied Gingles 1 using total population instead of CVAP data).
54. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 31, at 1.
55. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
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Bureau and other administrative “guidelines and standards,”56 and flouted
the Bureau’s forceful recommendation that the question not be added because
it was, among other things, “likely to depress self-response rates.”57
Although self-response is just the first step in decennial data collection, the
record showed that NRFU was “at least as likely” to suffer from the same
underlying problem as self-response:58 widespread fear that, amid
aggressive anti-immigrant enforcement, census citizenship responses might
be used against noncitizen respondents or noncitizen members of the
respondent’s household or community.59
Importantly, the resulting undercount would extend beyond noncitizens.
“[B]oth citizens and non-citizens” would be undercounted, particularly
citizens living with noncitizens.60 The question would be particularly
sensitive for the 10 percent of households estimated to contain at least one
noncitizen.61 This hammer “would fall most heavily on minority
communities.”62
Despite these concerns, a majority of the Supreme Court held that
Secretary Ross had the substantive authority to add the question—if only his
rationale had been truthful.63 Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court’s liberal
wing to affirm the district court’s injunction on the narrow pretext issue
only.64 After considering the Court’s invitation to proffer a fresh rationale,
President Donald J. Trump instead issued an Executive Order (EO) for the
Bureau to begin culling citizenship data from administrative records.65
2. Presidential Memorandum
If the abundant evidence of pretext had left any doubt as to the true intent
behind the citizenship question, the president’s July 2020 Presidential
Memorandum (PM) summarily eliminated it.66 Having already directed
Bureau officials to begin assembling citizenship data, the president was now
ordering them to erase, for apportionment purposes, any “illegal aliens” it
found.67
While the COVID-19 pandemic ultimately delayed the Bureau’s
apportionment calculation beyond the Trump presidency, and while
56. New York v. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
57. Id. at 532.
58. Id. at 585.
59. See Matthew M. Welch, Privacy Law Concerns Associated with the Reintroduction of
the Citizenship Question to the 2020 National Census, 10 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 11–12
(2020) (documenting past weaponization of census data).
60. New York v. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 579, 584.
61. Id. (citation omitted).
62. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2584 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 2571–73 (majority opinion).
64. Id. at 2575.
65. Exec. Order No. 13,880, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,821 (July 11, 2019).
66. Excluding Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census,
85 Fed. Reg. 44,679 (July 21, 2020).
67. Id.
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President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. has subsequently revoked the PM,68 nothing
can undo the “widespread confusion” that the PM—published months before
the self-response deadline—created among affected communities “as to
whether they should participate in the census,” further buoying differential
undercount risks.69
3. COVID-19 Flip-Flop
Perhaps the PM’s largest impact was to evaporate the Trump
administration’s support for the Bureau’s COVID-19 extension requests.70
The pandemic imposed “significant operational disruptions” on the 2020
Census.71 The Bureau was “unable to hire and train enumerators,” faced with
households “unwilling to answer their doors” for NRFU,72 and forced to
grapple with mass relocation.73 While the Trump administration initially
supported legislative efforts to extend the apportionment deadline, in July
2020 it made an abrupt “about-face.”74 Immediately after the PM was issued,
“there was suddenly a ‘push to complete NRFU asap,’” amid “drastically
cut” deadlines from the Commerce Department.75
This provoked near-universal derision from independent experts and
agencies,76 former Bureau directors,77 the Inspector General,78 and civil
rights groups,79 among others. Nonetheless, unruffled by the prospect of
68. Hansi Lo Wang, Biden Ends Trump Census Policy, Ensuring All Persons Living in
U.S.
Are
Counted,
NPR
(Jan.
20,
2021,
10:31
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/inauguration-day-live-updates/2021/01/20/958376223/bidento-end-trump-census-policy-ensuring-all-persons-living-in-u-s-are-counted
[https://perma.cc/4SZ9-Q8Q7]. For analysis of the harm the PM would have caused, see
Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530, 538 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69. New York v. Trump, 485 F. Supp. 3d 422, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), vacated and
remanded, 141 S. Ct. 530 (2020).
70. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., NO. OIG-20-050-M, THE
ACCELERATION OF THE CENSUS SCHEDULE INCREASES THE RISKS TO A COMPLETE AND
ACCURATE 2020 CENSUS 7 (2020), https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-20-050M.pdf [https://perma.cc/W58Z-QW6S].
71. Ross v. Nat’l Urb. League, 141 S. Ct. 18, 19 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
72. Response to Application for a Stay Pending Appeal at 8, Ross, 141 S. Ct. 18 (No.
20A62).
73. See, e.g., D’Vera Cohn, It’s Clear Where College Students Are Counted in the 2020
Census, but Not Others Who Moved Due to COVID-19, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/17/its-clear-where-college-students-arecounted-in-the-2020-census-but-not-others-who-moved-due-to-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/VYX6-ULKQ].
74. See id.; Hansi Lo Wang, Census ‘Anomalies’ Could Thwart Trump’s Bid to Alter Next
Electoral College, NPR (Nov. 19, 2020, 5:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/19/
936561664/anomalies-found-in-census-could-thwart-trumps-bid-to-alter-electoral-college
[https://perma.cc/EQA6-CYZD].
75. Response to Application for a Stay Pending Appeal, supra note 72, at 10, 12.
76. Id. at 12.
77. See Press Release, Vincent Barabba et al., Statement by Former U.S. Census Bureau
Directors (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/7013550-Aug-4-2020Statement-By-Former-U-S-Census-Bureau.html [https://perma.cc/AP27-KX8Q].
78. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 70, at 5.
79. Response to Application for a Stay Pending Appeal, supra note 72, at 33.
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“materially larger” differential undercounts than even the 1990 Census,80 the
Court sided with the Trump administration.81
B. Harm to Electoral Representation for Communities of Color
And so the pattern of disadvantaging minority populations was allowed to
continue. As Part II.B explores, a cohesive strategy “to bolster white political
power at the expense of communities of color” that began with a tall tale
about VRA enforcement will instead subvert the VRA’s central mission:
safeguarding minority electoral power.82
1. Differential Undercount
The Trump administration’s interference is likely to beget a “huge
undercount” in the 2020 Census.83 This undercount will likely be unevenly
distributed84—there will, as always, be a differential undercount.85 Indeed,
although the citizenship question is gone, its legacy survives; many of the
concerns it aggravated predate the question itself, including persistent,
virulent anti-immigrant sentiment.86 There also remain widespread
misconceptions that the citizenship question did, in fact, appear on the 2020
Census.87
Accordingly, much of the projected differential undercount from the
citizenship question is also likely to have survived, affecting both
immigrants88 and citizens,89 particularly those within immigrant and
“immigrant-adjacent communities”—“predominantly communities of
color.”90 This will disproportionately affect Black residents, millions of
whom “live in or near hard-to-count immigrant and noncitizen
communities,”91 as well as Asian and Latinx residents, the two “largest
group[s] of immigrating persons” in the United States.92 Even after the
demise of both the citizenship question and the PM, the Bureau cannot go
back in time and unchill self-responses from these groups.
80. Id.
81. See generally Ross v. Nat’l Urb. League, 141 S. Ct. 18 (2020).
82. Cepeda Derieux et al., supra note 12, at 324–25.
83. See Sharon Driscoll-Stanford, How COVID-19 Makes the US Census Even More
Challenging, FUTURITY (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.futurity.org/covid-19-us-census-unitedstates-2433182-2/ [https://perma.cc/9KKP-HSEU].
84. See Cepeda Derieux et al., supra note 12, at 357.
85. See Danahy & Lang, supra note 36, at 1071–72; Hansi Lo Wang, 2020 Census Could
Lead to Worst Undercount of Black, Latinx People in 30 Years, NPR (June 4, 2019, 3:26 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/06/04/728034176/2020-census-could-lead-to-worst-undercountof-black-latinx-people-in-30-years [https://perma.cc/8Q6X-84ZL].
86. See Jennifer M. Chacón, The Inside-Out Constitution: Department of Commerce v.
New York, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 261–62.
87. See id. at 262 n.138.
88. See Nelson, supra note 13, at 1427–28.
89. See Chacón, supra note 86, at 259–61; Levitt, supra note 14, at 1364–65.
90. Nelson, supra note 13, at 1408.
91. Id. at 1425.
92. Id.; see also Chacón, supra note 86, at 237–38.
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Nor can it undo the pandemic. Projections rivaling 1990’s 4.6 percent
Black undercount and 5 percent Hispanic undercount93 are consistent with
the reality that minority groups are “disproportionately impacted by natural
disasters and economic downturns, both of which fuel displacement and alter
population growth patterns . . . which may result in the omission of their
households in Census enumeration.”94
2. Resulting Representation Harms to Minority Groups
The resulting harms to minority electoral power will manifest in at least
three separate buckets: apportionment, redistricting, and VRA enforcement.
Apportionment. The roots of the citizenship question extend back not just
to Hofeller, but also to conversations between Secretary Ross and Trump ally
Kris Kobach bemoaning the “problem” that “illegal aliens . . . are still
counted for . . . apportionment.”95 While it remains too early “to quantify
the precise impact on apportionment that the anticipated undercount” will
have, there is broad consensus that it will wreak significant harm upon
communities of color.96 The citizenship question was projected to “cause
several jurisdictions to lose seats in . . . apportionment.”97 Even without the
question, if its legacy proves as resilient as experts predict, the resulting
Latinx undercount will fall most heavily on the states with the largest
populations of undocumented immigrants, including California and New
York.98 Thus, “[d]espite fueling the nation’s growth from 2000 to 2010,”
Latinx communities are now poised for a representation decrease in many
areas.99
They will not be alone. About 10 percent of Black U.S. residents are
immigrants; 42 percent of that group are noncitizens, while 15 percent are
undocumented.100 California and New York—both at risk of losing seats—
are among the states with the largest Black populations.101 California is also
home to nearly one-third of all Asian Americans.102 Accordingly, even
without the PM, these populations are likely to suffer apportionment harm
stemming from the differential undercount.

93. See Response to Application for a Stay Pending Appeal, supra note 72, at 33.
94. Nelson, supra note 13, at 1435–36; see also Persily, supra note 43, at 769.
95. Cepeda Derieux et al., supra note 12, at 334–35.
96. Nelson, supra note 13, at 1417.
97. Danahy & Lang, supra note 36, at 1074–75.
98. Cepeda Derieux et al., supra note 12, at 331.
99. Nelson, supra note 13, at 1415–16.
100. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in Support
of Appellees at 16, Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530 (2020) (No. 20-366), 2020 WL
6876024.
101. Id. at 25. SONYA RASTOGI ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION:
2010,
at
8
(2011),
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M53Q-ZG8Q].
102. Gustavo López et al., Key Facts about Asian Americans, a Diverse and Growing
Population, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/09/08/key-facts-about-asian-americans/ [https://perma.cc/Q45P-JSS2].
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Redistricting. These undercounts will also affect intrastate electoral
power. Because decennial population data guides redistricting efforts, “an
inaccurate census could create [intrastate districts] that have nonuniform
populations.”103
In particular, immigrant and immigrant-adjacent104
communities—disproportionately of color105—stand to “drastically lose
political power in intrastate redistricting” under a differential undercount.106
Crucially, though, this is not just about undercounts. As Hofeller
emphasized, a “second, less well-known or covered but perhaps more
central” goal is to pave a path for states to flout the “historic norm” of
redistricting using total population and instead redistrict using CVAP
data107—a novel practice108 of questionable constitutionality.109 Allowing
districts to be drawn using only eligible voter counts would strip
representation from the “urban and suburban areas where most Americans
live”—particularly communities of color—and “boost representation in more
sparsely populated regions.”110 The net effect: to “recreate the disparities”
that birthed the VRA in the first place.111 While the VRA’s protections only
extend to eligible voters, the Trump administration’s decision to cloak this
“cynical” attempt to dilute the representation of minority groups in VRA
concerns still rings false.112
Additionally, concerns about the EO do place this issue squarely within
the VRA’s ambit. The EO directed the Bureau to use administrative records
to synthesize block-level CVAP data.113 Critics have worried that this data
is “less accurate than [the Bureau’s] block-level total-population counts”—
with some citizens “erroneously treated as likely non-U.S. citizens.”114 If
true, this would again disproportionately harm communities of color, who
tend to have “higher concentrations of foreign-born residents” and greater
numbers of citizens “vulnerable to being mischaracterized as likely non-U.S.
citizens.”115 Thus, the electoral power of eligible voters of color would suffer
relative to that of non-Hispanic white voters, particularly if the erosion in
public trust stemming from this practice further exacerbates future selfresponse inequities.
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104. See Levitt, supra note 14, at 1373.
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107. Levitt, supra note 14, at 1394; see also Persily, supra note 43, at 774–75.
108. See Jeff Zalesin, Beyond the Adjustment Wars: Dealing with Uncertainty and Bias in
Redistricting Data, 130 YALE L.J.F. 186, 207 (2020).
109. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016) (declining to reach the issue).
110. Michael Li, America’s Historic Fight over Who Deserves Representation, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (July 18, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/americas-historic-fight-over-who-deserves-representation [https://perma.cc/AL2ZCMYC].
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113. Exec. Order No. 13,880, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,821 (July 11, 2019).
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For now, President Biden has rescinded the EO.116 At the time of this
publication, his administration has yet to clarify its stance on the Bureau’s
collection of citizenship data through administrative records.117 There are
legitimate arguments in favor of continuing to do so. Career experts at the
Bureau contend that, purely as a matter of statistical methodology,
“combining multiple data sources, including administrative records and
surveys, [could] produce better estimates than could be produced solely from
ACS data.”118 But as a political matter, it may prove impossible to distill
good-faith scientific discussions from the EO’s partisan poisoning of
otherwise legitimate methodologies.119
VRA Enforcement. As a result, beyond its effect on the interests the VRA
was enacted to protect, the Trump administration’s census meddling also
risks harming VRA enforcement itself. Section 2 claims were already
becoming tougher to substantiate as U.S. cities diversify beyond the binary
racial construct envisioned by the VRA,120 and as increasingly complex
racial polarization in voting patterns have erected Gingles 2 and 3 hurdles.121
The Trump administration has made things harder. Section 2 claims rely
on CVAP data deriving from the decennial census and the ACS, both of
which have been impaired by the administration’s mischief.122 Citizenship
ACS responses were already fickle: almost one-third of ACS respondents
whom administrative records reveal to be noncitizens represent themselves
to be citizens on the ACS.123 And because the ACS is vulnerable to the same
“systematic undercoverage” of hard-to-count groups as the decennial census,
the decennial-differential undercount flames the Trump administration has
fanned will spread to the ACS too.124 The upshot for cracked and packed
communities: many potential districts that should warrant VRA protection
will nonetheless be absent from the data that Section 2 claimants need to
satisfy the Gingles factors.125
116. Wang, supra note 68.
117. Id.
118. John M. Abowd et al., Ctr. for Econ. Stud., U.S. Census Bureau, Determination of the
2020 U.S. Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) Using Administrative Records and
Statistical Methodology Technical Report 7 (Ctr. for Econ. Stud. Research Paper, CES 20-33,
2020), https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2020/CES-WP-20-33.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FHVK4PX].
119. See, e.g., Memorandum from Peggy E. Gustafson, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Com.
to Steven Dillingham, Dir., U.S. Census Bureau 1 (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-21-019-M.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3EFA82Z].
120. See Ming Hsu Chen & Taeku Lee, Reimagining Democratic Inclusion, 3 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 359, 380 (2013).
121. See Dale E. Ho, Two Fs for Formalism: Interpreting Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act in Light of Changing Demographics and Electoral Patterns, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
403, 411, 415 (2015); Katz et al., supra note 48, at 661–62.
122. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
123. See Levitt, supra note 14, at 1371.
124. See American Community Survey: Accuracy of the Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 20
(2018), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/accuracy/
ACS_Accuracy_of_Data_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZBY-58BX].
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III. MITIGATION
So what can be done? The 2020 Census is over. The inevitable differential
undercount will skew apportionment and filter into redistricting and Section
2 enforcement—all at the expense of communities of color.126 Still, there
remain opportunities to mitigate the damage. Part III proposes three such
steps that can be taken in varying degrees of immediacy over the coming
years.
A. Immediate: Voting Rights Legislation
While, as Part III.C discusses, the apportionment harms stemming from
the 2020 Census are now irreversible, the redistricting and VRA enforcement
harms are not. To start, even if the 2020 Census cannot be undone, its
redistricting and VRA harms can still be curtailed. The Section 2 risks posed
by the census all stem from one alterable premise: we are asking too much
of Section 2.127 Indeed, this was true even before the Supreme Court, on the
eve of the first post-Shelby County redistricting cycle,128 took a case that may
further defang Section 2.129
Robust voting rights legislation can help. Much has been written about the
ongoing assault against ballot access and the valiant legislative attempts to
parry these efforts.130 However, perhaps equally as impactful would be these
bills’ checks on redistricting abuse. Prior to Shelby County, sixteen states
were required to preclear their redistricting plans.131 While this was by no
means comprehensive, the chasm its absence creates—deepened by the
Court’s holding, on the same day it struck down the citizenship question, that
partisan gerrymandering is not justiciable132—cannot be fully measured until
post-2020-Census redistricting has occurred. The proposed Voting Rights
Advancement Act133 (which passed the House of Representatives in 2019),
if reintroduced and passed, would restore and strengthen VRA preclearance,
taking pressure off of Section 2.134 The For The People Act of 2021,135
which passed the House in March 2021, would go further by “ban[ning]
126. See supra Part II.B.
127. See supra Part I.B.2.
128. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
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Impact,
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(Feb.
17,
2021,
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Rights,
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
3,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/03/democrats-need-hr-1-and-new-vraprotect-voting-rights/618171/ [https://perma.cc/4QF5-YYX6].
131. See What Is Preclearance?, ROSE INST. (Feb. 8, 2012), https://roseinstitute.org/whatis-preclearance/ [https://perma.cc/KT6H-6DAU].
132. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2502 (2019).
133. H.R. 4, 116th Cong. (2019).
134. See Michael Waldman, Democracy’s Next Battleground, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/democracys-nextbattleground [https://perma.cc/2RGH-SGLN].
135. H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021).
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partisan gerrymandering,” establishing uniform “enhanced protections to
make sure the political effectiveness of communities of color is not diluted,”
and creating an “expedited” right of redress that would effectively replace
Section 2 as the frontier for redistricting challenges.136
If these bills pass, the barriers for Section 2 plaintiffs to satisfy the Gingles
factors using suspect CVAP data will immediately become less important.
While minority populations will still suffer from differential undercounts,
those harms will not be compounded by districts methodically calibrated to
pack or crack them into oblivion.137 Or at least their hopes to counter such
attempts will not rest solely on imperfect CVAP data.138
B. Intermediate: Privacy Protections
Still, even if these bills become law, census data is likely to play some role
under the new standards. And that data will continue to be skewed by privacy
concerns.
A unifying theme throughout the 2020 Census saga has been the drain on
self-responses attributable to fear that those responses will be used against
respondents.139 These fears feast upon skepticism that confidential census
data will in fact remain confidential.140 While there are stringent
confidentiality assurances that make it a federal crime to release identifiable
census data about respondents,141 such restrictions have not always
prevented the Bureau from lawfully disclosing data in ways that have
perpetuated public misgivings.142 At the very least, these breaches of public
trust cannot be allowed to recur.
But the more immediate risks to respondent privacy are actually
aboveboard. The ability to cross-reference public census data against public
non-census data to reidentify individual census respondents is something that
large-scale data operators (including the Bureau itself) have been able to
accomplish in tests using 2010 decennial data.143 The Bureau must be
empowered, and funded, to mobilize technical protections such as
“differential privacy,” which provides functionally accurate data while
preserving respondent confidentiality by injecting localized noise into census

136. Annotated Guide to the For the People Act of 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar.
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141. See How the Census Bureau Protects Your Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://2020census.gov/en/data-protection.html [https://perma.cc/544X-2VJM] (last visited
Mar. 25, 2021).
142. See Welch, supra note 59.
143. See Ron Jarmin, Census Bureau Adopts Cutting Edge Privacy Protections for 2020
Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/
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products that smooths out at higher levels of generality.144 And—perhaps
the tallest order of all—these efforts must be effectively communicated to a
diffuse and distrustful public.145 Such steps are vital to avoid further eroding
public trust, particularly among already hard-to-count populations,
exacerbating self-response inequities and, as a result, differential undercount
risks for communities of color.146 Crucially, although 2030 is years away,
because these risks also apply to the ACS, they pose a perpetual CVAP threat.
C. Ultimate: Reduce Reliance on Headcounts
These issues also raise a larger question: how much should the Bureau
rely upon a traditional “census” at all? For apportionment purposes, this
question is currently settled, at least as a statutory matter—the apportionment
count must flow from enumeration, rather than from any kind of “sampling”
or statistical modeling, even if incorporating such practices can unlock
greater accuracy than a naked enumeration attempt (including correcting for
differential undercounts).147 Importantly, these restrictions apply only to
apportionment; there is no statutory requirement tethering CVAP and
redistricting data products to either the decennial count or the ACS.148
This matters. The 2020 Census cast an unflattering light on a problem it
did not invent: the challenges inherent to an actual headcount. Those
challenges lead to differential undercounts.149 Under current practices,
despite the lack of a statutory mandate, those differential undercounts are
permitted to permeate the Bureau’s data products—disproportionately
erasing communities of color in block-level redistricting data and in the
CVAP data that Section 2 plaintiffs rely on to secure electoral
representation.150
As counterintuitive as it may seem to those justifiably leery of the Trump
administration’s motives for leveraging administrative records, communities
of color could be better served by the Bureau relying more on other data
sources and smart statistical modeling rather than on respondent-reliant
headcounts inevitably hampered by differential undercount concerns.
Among experts, there is significant optimism surrounding the prospect of
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empowering Bureau experts to use more data, more intelligently,151
particularly in light of the demonstrable differential undercount risks inherent
to more traditional methods.152 Of course, as the reasonable concerns
surrounding the EO demonstrate, such steps must be taken prudently—driven
by expertise and insulated from the stench of politics.153
CONCLUSION
It is imperative to evaluate such reforms not only against perfection, but
against a status quo that is widely accepted as flawed—flawed at the expense
of Black, Latinx, Asian, Native, and other vulnerable populations.154 Reform
is unlikely to be perfect, but paralysis in the face of predictable injustice is
far more destructive.
Meanwhile, for Americans of color, the representation harms—hefty as
they are—are only part of the story. Billions of dollars are allocated based
on census data: Medicaid, FEMA relief, and (of particular importance today)
public health preparedness, among other things.155 To be erased from the
census is to be discounted from these initiatives for an entire decade.
And of course, without electoral power, it only gets harder to right these
wrongs.
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